Technology

Small Satellites and International Security

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Orbiting satellites perform many tasks: communications, broadcasting, weather forecasting, earth observation, intelligence-gathering, and scientific research. The first satellite, launched in 1957, was a modest metal sphere containing a simple radio transmitter. Since then, satellites have grown in size and complexity. Many are visible to anyone with a reasonably powerful backyard telescope.

Today, however, satellites are shrinking. States and commercial firms are now launching small satellites in large numbers. Small satellites differ significantly from traditional large satellites in size, orbital distance, lifespan, cost, and application.

Medium and large satellites typically weigh in at 1000-2000lbs (though some weigh much more) and are similar in size to a car or a large van. Small satellites come in many categories, from mini-satellites weighing 220-400lbs to picosatellites under 2 pounds. Some are about the size of a piano. Others are as small as a Rubik’s cube or a small jewelry box. The 10x10x10cm Cube Satellite design has been widely adopted by small countries’ space agencies, start-ups, hobbyists, and citizen science groups since the late 1990s.

Satellites operate in three categories of orbits: Low Earth Orbit (LEO) at about 100-1200 miles above the earth’s surface, Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) at 10,000 miles, and Geostationary or Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO/GSO) at 22,200 miles. The Center for Strategic and International Studies’s Aerospace Security Project estimates that over 90 percent of all satellites are situated in LEO and GEO due to harmful radiation at the MEO orbital range. At the GEO level, satellites maintain a fixed position in relation to specific locations on the Earth's surface, while LEO satellites continually change position, completing an orbit around the Earth in approximately 90 minutes to two hours.

A common misconception is that small satellites are miniature versions of traditional satellites. But as NASA Administrator Dr. Bhavya Lal has emphasized, small satellites are “fundamentally different entities” that offer different sets of capabilities. As Dr. John Mulholland notes, these capabilities include continuous global coverage of dynamic systems (e.g. weather, radiation environments, the Earth’s magnetic field, the atmosphere, and on). Most traditional satellites tend to focus on Earth observation (47%) and communication (32%), with gradually increasing roles in science, technology, and navigation. Conversely, most small satellites focus on Earth observation and remote sensing (EO/RS) (51%) and communications (21%), with growing roles in communications and novel applications.

The Political Economy of Space

GEO satellites typically have higher launch costs and a greater latency (i.e., signal delay) period due to distance, with a lifespan of roughly 15 years in orbit. LEO satellites are much less expensive and have a shorter latency period but only last around 7-10 years. Further, due to LEO satellites’ constant movement, providing broadband connection at the LEO level requires a constellation of many satellites to maintain continuous coverage. While launching advanced, traditional satellites can cost upwards of $300 or $400 million, the cost to launch a small satellite has been reduced considerably due to technological and organizational developments in mass production, processing power, and time-to-market. SpaceX, for instance, has reduced satellite launch costs to $60 million. Reduced small satellite launch costs may enable more innovative experimentation in areas like refueling, launch-on-demand capabilities to replace damaged satellites, and space manufacturing. Interestingly, reduced costs allow small satellites to become larger, permitting designs with better imagery technology, antennas, and on.

Large companies like SpaceX, Amazon, and OneWeb, as well as numerous start-ups, are developing vast constellations of thousands of LEO satellites to provide internet service globally. While providing internet via satellite is not new, it has historically been done at the GEO level, with slower speeds and higher latency. It is uncertain if these companies will achieve sustained profitability or if the technology will become competitive with faster and cheaper broadband alternatives; so far, companies seem to have depended upon large sources of alternative funding, including government subsidies. Additionally, the private sector’s increased hold over space infrastructure may complicate the state’s domain over national security. For instance, Elon Musk’s attempts to limit Ukraine's military use of SpaceX technology during Russia’s war against Ukraine has triggered debate on how private sector ownership of small satellite technologies may impact future conflicts.

National Security Implications

Small satellites pose clear national security challenges. They provide adversaries with cheaper, real-time reconnaissance and operational support. For instance, during Russia’s war against Ukraine, small satellites have procured high-speed internet access and backup communications while expediting high-quality imagery and geospatial intelligence collection.

They also potentially put U.S. assets at risk. Small satellites’ lower barriers to entry invite military experimentation from established space powers and from states without a spacefaring tradition. Consequently, states are investing more in space and counterspace defense capabilities. Counterspace capabilities include kinetic-physical (e.g., missiles, aircraft), non-kinetic-physical (e.g., lasers, electromagnetic pulses), electronic, and cyber weapons. These capabilities may “disrupt, deny, degrade, and destroy” other states’ satellite systems in peacetime and during conflict. States are also researching and developing defensive satellite tactics, including satellite dispersion, updating, and replenishment. While the commercial leaders are U.S.-based, some speculate the U.S. lead in small satellite technologies is diminishing.

In the United States, two recently-created Department of Defense organizations make use of commercial space capabilities and services: the U.S. Space Force and the Space Development Agency (SDA). U.S. Space Force enhances national security in space by engaging with commercial space companies, awarding contracts to startups, and streamlining small-satellite development programs. SDA is responsible for accelerating military space capabilities and developing the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA), a network of small satellites that aims to provide real-time support for warfighters through enhanced communication, tracking, defense, situational awareness, and navigation in various operational scenarios.

Emerging Challenges

Managing orbital debris and space traffic is a major challenge due to the difficulty of tracking objects in space, removing debris, and avoiding collisions. Policymakers must also address launch backlogs that disproportionately affect smaller companies while efficiently managing the rapid growth of the space industry through domestic and international regulation.

Internationally, numerous organizations share responsibility in regulating and coordinating activities in space; these organizations include the UN’s Office for Out Space Affairs (UNOOSA), the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Small satellites are revolutionizing the space domain through mass production, compact electronics, affordable launches, and the generation of vast data and communication capabilities in Low Earth Orbits. The advancement of small satellite technology has considerable implications for national security and the global economy. Addressing the challenges associated with small satellites will require a mix of national strategy and international coordination.

About the Author

Christopher Barclay is a graduate student in SIS's U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security program. He has researched accountability frameworks at the Stimson Center’s Cyber Program, explored tech and foreign policy economics, and honed language skills in Russian and Spanish. His research interests include cybersecurity, autonomy and AI, and ethical tech policy.