Taiwan's 2024 Elections: Effects on EU Relations
Introduction
Taiwan, officially the Republic of China (ROC), held its presidential elections this January as part of the 2024 general elections. Lai Ching-te, Vice President to President Tsai Ing-wen for the past four years, secured another term for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) after winning the election with a plurality of 40.05%. The inauguration was scheduled for May 20 of this year with Hsiao Bi-khim, former Representative to the United States (de facto ambassador), as his Vice President. In addition to the international spotlight, what made this election striking were the concerns over the island’s democratic health. An indicative factor is that the presidential election turnout rate has been slowly decreasing. This was also the first time since the 2000 election that the winning candidate obtained less than 50% of the vote. Finally, this marked the first time that a party won more than two consecutive presidential elections since direct elections were first introduced in 1996.
However, the 2024 elections demonstrate more than a democratic result. Underneath the whirlwind of global media coverage and political discourse, the 2024 election results highlight the dynamic between domestic government branches, Taiwanese public opinion, and Taiwan’s foreign policy in international relations. The outcome of these elections also carries implications for Taiwan’s international partners like the European Union (EU) that share democratic traditions and mutual interest in strengthening their relationship.
Background
Before the establishment of the EU, many European states engaged in relations with the Ming dynasty as early as the 16th century. Among these, notable relationships include those between Britain and China, as well as interactions with the Empire of Japan (Taiwan was ceded to Japan by the Qing dynasty, remaining under Japanese colonial rule from 1895 to 1945). During this period, the ROC was established in 1912 and was relocated from Mainland China to Taiwan in 1949. Prior to 1996, before the start of Taiwan’s democratization process in 1987, the president and vice president positions were filled through indirect elections by the National Assembly. Taiwan underwent a remarkably rapid democratization process, currently outpacing previously established democratic nations in the latest Democracy Index. Taiwan achieved an overall score of 8.92 out of 10, maintaining its position as first in Asia and securing tenth place globally. Relations between Taiwan and European governments remained unofficial until the 1990s when several European countries started to upgrade relations. In 2001, the EU Commission referred to Taiwan as a “separate customs territory, but not as a sovereign state,” recognizing Taiwan’s status as an autonomous economic entity. This acknowledgment set the foundation for the establishment of relations with the EU, fostering a growing number of people-to-people and educational exchanges.
More recently, Taiwan-EU relations have grown through trade relations and increased interactions. These include Taiwan’s donation of masks to EU countries to combat the COVID-19 outbreak, visits by European Parliament delegations, and resolutions pertaining to Taiwan. In 2021, the European Parliament not only reaffirmed its vigilance regarding “situations'' in Taiwan and the enhancement of political and trade relations between the EU and the ROC, but also advocated for increased international participation. In 2022, different perspectives emerged from the EU ambassador to China, Jorge Toledo Albiñana, and the Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Joanne Ou. Ambassador Jorge Toledo Albiñana expressed the EU’s stance against Taiwan's independence, and that Europe upholds peaceful unification between China and Taiwan. Conversely, Joanne Ou emphasized the island’s sovereignty and democracy, underlining the ability of Taiwanese people to determine their own future. Nevertheless, since the ROC became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu” in 2002, the EU has strengthened bilateral trade relations, through which Taiwan has become the EU’s fourteenth-largest trading partner in 2020 and the EU has become Taiwan’s largest foreign investor. However, Taiwan’s participation in international organizations remains as an “observer” rather than a full member.
TPP’s Effects
The Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), a relatively new political party that serves as an alternative to the DPP and Kuomintang (KMT), successfully shook up traditional party lines and election results with its new politics and criticisms towards Taiwan’s previous governance. Moreover, this shift in political power could have significant implications for Taiwan’s future policies towards and relations with the EU. Ko Wen-je, the leader of the TPP, attracted young people by centering the issues they care about, such as growing wealth inequality. This, in turn, naturally created a special base of young voters to support him in hopes of breaking the traditional two-party mold and bringing about real change. Additionally, in dealing with relationships between China and the United States, Ko called himself the only candidate acceptable to both states and demonstrated interest in staying in the “middle ground” and cooperating with both nations. The populist TPP political disrupter successfully garnered more than a quarter of the votes and gained eight seats in the new 113-seat legislature where the major parties no longer have a clear majority. Now that the government is divided, with DPP controlling the executive and a KMT majority in the legislature, negotiations between branches and among parties will be necessary to accomplish anything. The TPP has succeeded in its mission of breaking away from the two-party domination of “blue” and “green” camps. This success hinges on the bargaining power the TPP holds, resulting in societal benefits through party compromises that deliver necessary policies. In turn, these policies will affect the island’s trajectory in its partnerships with European nations, as more varying opinions will clash and keep Taiwan from swaying in either direction.
International Implications and Policy Cooperation
Even though Lai won by a wide margin, he will face steep challenges in policymaking and relationship-building due to the DPP’s lack of majority in the Legislative Yuan. Despite different party values and priorities, more than 80 percent of Taiwanese people want to maintain the status quo: an autonomous Taiwan regardless of the island's identity and status. Moreover, to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, Lai has guaranteed to maintain operational independence as ROC and has expressed readiness to conduct exchanges and cooperation with China. This also satisfies the US’s “strategic ambiguity” policy, in which the Biden Administration does not support Taiwanese independence. On the other hand, all major political parties in Taiwan seek more political distance from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) without declaring independence. The interpretation of “One China Policy'' remains different between the PRC and other states. Beijing defines Taiwan as part of the PRC, while other partnering states adopt a more ambiguous stance on Taiwan’s status in order to foster and enhance interactions, especially given its increasing importance in global supply chains and technology within the Asian region.
It has always been challenging to bolster stronger relationships with Taiwan, both in 1971 when all European countries gradually restored relations with Beijing, as well as in today’s politically fractured environment that is marked by consistent pressure from the PRC. When Lai steps into his presidency, it is likely that Taiwan will continue fostering trade relations and economic cooperation with the EU, though closer cooperation in other capacities is improbable. He has already shown his willingness to deepen trade ties and engage economically with the EU, as well as to cooperate on issues like climate change. As Taiwan leverages the strengths of its domestic businesses to stimulate economic growth and industrial development, the government will still actively promote its “5+N Innovative Industries” development program. Linking with local and domestic industries to further grow in international markets, the program includes smart machinery, Asian Silicon Valley (the Internet of Things), green energy, semiconductors, and more. Taiwan’s vision to achieve a fully digital economy with smart infrastructure and high-value green services will naturally need more international interaction and cooperation to increase its industrial growth. Taiwan already plays a leading international role by establishing ties with the EU through its semiconductor chip supply, as the EU simultaneously aims to double its market share to 20 percent by 2030 but lacks major production plants. As President-elect Lai hopes to build more and better ties with European states, Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu has invited European leaders to “do more” and not only focus on semiconductor production.
Moving forward, European relations with Taiwan will remain at a standstill with a minor increase in economic ties unless European policymakers implement new strategies. While Lai aims to pursue more trade deals with Europe and elected politicians in the Parliament both desire stronger ties with the continent, the EU remains constrained by its pragmatic stance, maintaining a delicate balance to avoid diplomatic conflict with Beijing. However, upcoming shifts in European Parliament dynamics that are forecasted to lean toward center-right parties may then become more sympathetic to Taipei, and could potentially alter this landscape. In the midst of political complexities, the anticipated shifts in European Parliament dynamics offer the possibility for more partnerships with Europe, potentially reshaping the future landscape of their relations.
About the Author
Emily Brignand graduated with a BA in International Studies from the School of International Service at American University. Her concentrations included a regional focus in East Asia and the Pacific, with an emphasis on China, and thematic areas in Identity, Race, Gender & Culture (IRGC) and Justice, Ethics & Human Rights (JEHR). She is currently the Program Associate at the US-China Education Trust. Emily's interests include China/East Asia studies, US-China relations, cross-strait ties, and AAPI advocacy.