The  theory  of  international  regime  complexity  that  frames  this  study  specifies  expectations  for  international  cooperation  stemming  from  different  combinations  of  hierarchy  and  differentiation  among  institutions  in  regime  complexes.  

This new paper by SIS Professor Randall Henning in the Review of International Political Economy compares  relationships  between  regional  financial  arrangements  and  the  international  Monetary  Fund  in  the  regional  complexes  for  crisis  finance  in East Asia, Latin America,  and  the Euro Area  during  2000-2019  and  tests  these  expectations. 

Creditor  states  that  sit  at  the  nexus  between  global  and  regional  institutions  are  particularly  influential  in  the  choice  of  architecture  (the  combination  of  hierarchy  and  differentiation)  for  these  complexes  but  are  constrained  by  arrangements  inherited  from  previous  decades.  Once  chosen,  the  complex’s  architecture  in  turn  shapes  policy  adjustment  in  borrowing  countries  and  influences  whether  states  pursue  regime  shifting  or  competitive  regime  creation  when  dissatisfied  with  institutions.  these  findings  generally  coincide  with  expectations,  but  exceed  the  degree  of  policy  adjustment  that  the  core  theory  expected  for  the Euro Area. Interinstitutional  collaboration,  the  dynamics  of  which  are  elaborated,  fills  this  explanatory  gap.  

The  paper  concludes  that  relations  among  institutions  are  essential  for  understanding  the  outcomes  and  evolution  of  regime  complexes and underpin a more complete explanation than provided by singular institutionalism,  the  power-gap  hypothesis  and  other  alternative  approaches.

Read the full open-access article here.